Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 22

Issue 4

Article 11

1934

Taxation--Can College Fraternity Property Be Exempt in
Kentucky?--Contra View
Eleanor Dawson
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Dawson, Eleanor (1934) "Taxation--Can College Fraternity Property Be Exempt in Kentucky?--Contra View,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 22: Iss. 4, Article 11.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol22/iss4/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KNTuCmy LAw JouRNAL
pose of a college fraternity is to promote educational, moral and social
culture, and that a fraternity is not run for pecuniary profit.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Omega Chapter of Psi
Upsilon Fraternity, supra, held that college fraternities were exempt
from taxation under Illinois Statutes, Ch. 120, Sec. 2, which exempted
from taxation "all property used exclusively for school . .. purposes
. . . and not used with a view of profit." This case, whose decision
was based on a statute which is almost identical with Section 170 of
the Kentucky Constitution, represents the better modern attitude
toward college fraternities as educational institutions, as evidenced by
the fact that, although the court made no mention of the case of Knox
College v. Board of Review of Knox County, supra, yet, as it is of a
later date, it must be given precedence over the Knox College case.
From the foregoing, this writer is of the opinion that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, in the event the question of whether college fraternities are exempt from taxation under Section 170 of the Kentucky
Constitution comes before them for adjudication, should hold that they
are exempt.
WILLIAM MELLOIL

TAXATION-CAN COLLEGE FRATERNrTY PRoPRTY BE ExE.PuT IN

KEN-

TUeCY?--CoNTRA Vnw.--Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution deal-

ing with exemptions from taxation, exempts "institutions of purely
public charity and institutions of education not used or employed for
gain by any person or corporation, and the income from which is devoted solely to the cause of education."
Does college fraternity property come within the exemption? Is
a fraternity house an institution of purely public charity, or an institution of education within the meaning of Section 170?
While there are no cases bearing directly on the subject in Kentucky, a study of the constitutional provision and similar constitutional
provisions in other states where cases have arisen, leads one to believe
that college fraternity property does not come within the exemption,
and that a statute exempting such property from taxation would be
invalid.
A leading case, People v. Alpha Phi of Phi Kappa Sigma Educational Association of University of Chicago, 326 ll. 573, 158 N. E. 213
(1927), holds that a fraternity is not a public charity, although it may
be the means of helping some members through school. Only members
of the fraternity are benefitted thereby, and they are chosen under rules
of the societies themselves and not by virtue of attendance at the school.
To constitute a public charity, the benefit must not be conferred on
definite persons, or defined individuals, but must be conferred on indefinite persons composing the public, or some part of the public; but
the indefinite clause may be one sex, or the inhabitants of a particular
city or town, or members of particular religious or secular organiza-
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tions. The primary purpose of a college fraternity is not charity, and
even though one or two members of the particular fraternity are aided
financially, it Is not in any sense a public charity.
Kentucky, until 1907, did not even go so far as Illinois is defining
a public charity. In that year the widows and orphans of Odd Fellows
were defined as a part of the public so as to make the home provided
for them a public charity-Widows and Orphans Home of Odd Fellows
v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 386, 103 S. W. 354 (1907). Kentucky, however, in order to hold an organization of a public charitable nature,
stresses that its primary purpose be charitable and not fraternal or
social. A certain lodge of Knights Templars was not a purely public
charity-Vogt v. City of Louisville, 173 Ky. 119, 190 S. W. 695 (1917).
The Benevolent Association of Elks is not an institution of purely
public charity. Benevolent Association of Elks -v. Wintersmith, 204
Ky. 20, 263 S. W. 670 (1924). By analogy, it seems clear that a college
social fraternity would not be a public charitable organization.
Is a college fraternity an educational institution? Kentucky has no
cases in point. Perhaps the most nearly analogous case is the Berea
College Case, 149 Ky. 95, 157 S. W. 929 (1912), in which exemption
was allowed for a laundry, printing department, waterworks system,
supply store, and other properties operated in connection with Berea
College. Berea, however, trains all its pupils in manual labor and uses
the proceeds for maintenance of the school. The laundry, printing department, etc., were part of the educational equipment. A college fraternity house plays no part in the actual education of the student. It
teaches him nothing that the school requires him to know. True, it
may provide training in social deportment, but this is not a part of the
school curriculum. The fraternity is a social organization largelyr
and benefits its members in that way. Oregon Kappa Gamma Rho vMarion County, 130 Ore. 165, 279 P. 55 (1929). Dictum in a Kentucky
case says that the theory of exemption of educational and charitable
institutions is that the institutions are performing a service which
the state itself is obligated to discharge. If no service is performed
toward the public, no exemption is allowed, even though in a broad
sense the institution may be said to be educational or charitable. Layman's Foundationv. City of Louisville, 232 Ky. 259, 22 S. W. (2d) 622
(1929).
It may be urged that fraternity houses are recreational centers
and are a necessary adjunct to the school, such as an athletic field or
swimming pool might be consideretd. A lake used exclusively for recreational purposes was held exempt as a necessary part of school.
See People v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 311 Ill. 11, 142 N. E. 5201
(1924). The lake, however, was open to all students and was under
control and direction of the school. It was owned and operated by the
school. A college fraternity, while it is subject to a few disciplinary
regulations by the school, Is decidedly not a working part of it. A fra-
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ternity house cannot be exempt as a school dormitory, when it is open
only to the members of that particular fraternity who are chosen not
by virtue of college attendance, but by rules established by the societies
themselves. Knox College v. Board of Review of Knox County, 308
Ill. 160, 139 N. E. 824 (1923), refused exemption, reasoning that housing or boarding of students is not in itself an educational process any
more than is the housing or boarding of any other human beings. For
further discussion of this case and allied cases on the same point, see
note by Harlan Hobert Grooms, 14 Ky. Law Journal 338.
There are a few states allowing exemption to fraternity property,
but an examination of leading cases shows that a constitutional provision is lacking, or is somewhat different from ours.
State v. Allen, 189 Ind. 369, 127 N. E. 145 (1920), is the strongest
case for the other side. It exempted fraternity houses under a statute specifically exempting Greek letter societies' property when occupied
and used exclusively for the purposes of the societies. This statute
was declared not to be in conflict with the constitution of Indiana,
which provided that only such property should be exempt as used for
municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes as may be especially exempted by law. This appears to allow the
legislature somewhat more leeway than our constitutional provision,
but it is clearly liberally construed in Indiana.
Kappa Kappa Gamma House Association v. Pearcy, 92 Kan. 1020,
142 P. 294 (1914), was decided under a similar statute exempting
buildings of college and university societies used as literary halls or
dormitories. The validity of the statute was not questioned. Beta
Theta Pi v. Board of Commissioners, 108 Old. 78, 324 P. 254 (1925),
granted exemption under a constitutional provision which enumerated
exemptions for certain property, and specifically provided that all other
property exempt during the time that Oklahoma was a territory was to
remain exempt unless a statute was passed to the contrary. No statute was passed regarding fraternity property, hence, it was exempt.
The general rule is that tax exemption statutes are strictly construed. (See 2 Cooley Taxation, Fourth Edition, Sec. 672, for a discussion of state and federal cases.)
If the problem were to be determined solely by a literal or linguistic interpretation of the word,
"charitable" or "educational," it is admitted that the court might
readily find either way. Indeed, a few states have held that cases Involving charitable, religious, or educational institutions are exceptions
to the strict construction rule. Indianapolis v. Grand Master, Etc. of
Grand Lodge of Indiana, 25 Ind. 518; Adams County v. Catholic Diocese
of Natchez, 110 Miss. 890, 71 So. 17. But there is special reason at this
time why we have a right to expect a strict construction by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The state is in a perilous financial condition.
Two legislatures have failed to provide for adequate revenue. It Is
-nnthinkable that in this financial crisis the Court of Appeals would, by
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interpretation, exempt property that is now subject to taxation. The
legal fundamentalist may insist that the courts are logic-machines, operating in a vacuum; but the realist is aware that the court should and
does consider public policy as the background of its decisions.
ELEANOR DAWSON.

CRIMES-REuOcXss

DISREGARD IN THE USE OF Fiasas.-It

is

re-

markable to note how varied and unsettled the law is as to reckless disregard in the use of firearms. Many jurisdictions hold that where the
shooting is unintentional and accidental, no matter how grossly negligent and careless the act, the accused may only be convicted of either
voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. Other jurisdictions, however,
adopt the apparently harsher rule and hold the defendant for voluntary
manslaughter or for murder. After a close perusal of both comparatively old cases and of more modern ones it appears impossible to tell
In which direction the tendency lies. The writer believes that for the
protection of society, the latter rule, which is also the more stringent
one, should be applied in a majority of cases; that is, where a defendant has been found so regardless of human life as to kill another
by the reckless use of firearms, and whose only defense is that the
death was unintentional, he should be indicted and convicted on a
charge of murder.
The hesitancy of courts to follow this rule is exemplified in an
early Kentucky case. Sparks v. Con., 3 Bush 116 (1867). The accused
while walking down a public street, deliberately fired his pistol over
his shoulder, and the shot struck and killed another. The court recognizing the viciousness of the act rendered a verdict of manslaughter
and said, "The acts of the accused manifest such recklessness and
want of caution as to indicate not only an entire absence of every precaution to prevent the pistol from firing, but impresses the mind that
he did recklessly and intentionally so fire it. If a man contrary to
law and good order and public security, fires off a pistol in the streets
of a town and death be the result, he must answer criminally for it."
This could easily have been a verdict of murder, and in a neighboring
jurisdiction only a few years later, such a verdict was reached. State
v. Edwards, 71 Mo. 312 (1879). Defendant while in an intoxicated condition, fired a pistol into a crowd of people collected in a public park.
There was a. question as to defendant's intention to kill anyone in
particular. The jury charge was, "Altho the jury may believe from
the evidence that defendant fired into the crowd with no particular intention to kill, yet if he purposely and intentionally did shoot into the
crowd with a revolver loaded with gunpowder and by reason of this
shot the said deceased died, then you will find the defendant guilty
of murder in the second degree." The court found there was no error
in the charge. A much later Kentucky case held accused only guilty
of manslaughter. Hawkins v. Com., 142 Ky. 188, 133 S. W. 1151 (1911).

